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   As recently as twenty years ago, discussions of Japanese business and industrial 
organisations were primarily carried out by academic researchers for an academic audience. 
Today, an article on the auto industry in Business Week or in the Harvard Business Review is as 
likely to discuss Toyota and Nissan as GM and Ford. The terms kamban and keiretsu have 
entered the American business lexicon, as TQC and automation (6-to-me-shon) entered Japanese 
in the 1950s. The study of Japanese business organisations has migrated from economics, 
sociology, and history departments into America's business schools and its business media. 
   The analysis of Japan's business organisations and environments therefore has come to 
address a vastly expanded audience, which is receiving information from a wide array of 
sources in the business and general press and for whom understanding Japan is a matter of 
immediate practical concern rather than theoretical interest. The audience includes business 
school students at a range of levels, from the undergraduate through the MBA to executive 
education programmes, the managers who hire their graduates and evaluate the quality of 
business school education, the consultants who draw on professorial expertise and academic 
research, and business journalists looking for a new slant or a new contribution to the 
ongoing discussions of Japanese business. All of these audiences demand information that is 
relevant to their immediate concerns, predictive (as one businessman said to me, "I don't want to 
know what the Japanese did yesterday; I want to know what they are going to do tomorrow"), 
and consistent with their general assumptions about how the world wnrks. 
   In the last two decades, the concerns of these audiences have tended to cluster around 
four major perspectives on Japan and the Japanese company: as a market or customer, as a 
competitor, as a collaborator/ strategic ally, and as a model. Each issue tends to be addressed 
in a distinct literature, with distinct approaches, and relatively few of those working on these 
issues are Japan specialists: while the absolute numbers of Japan specialists working on 
business - related research have grown in the last decade or so, their proportion of those writing 
about Japan has steadily dwindled. But ironically, the issue of convergence that was so 
central to the more specialised social science debates of two and three decades ago remains at 
the heart of each of these different and often apparently contradictory topics. This paper looks 
at each of these perspectives and assesses the potential contribution from the Japan 
specialists to the often contentious discussions of each.
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CHANGING PERSPECTIVES: 
   The first analysis of Japanese organisations was James Abegglen's The Japanese Factory, 
published in 1958, which drew attention to the many ways in which Japanese factory 
organisation differed from its Western counterparts, especially in terms of the seniority wage 
system, lifetime employment, and the enterprise union. This initiated over two decades of 
social science research focused on the factory in Japan, which became a battleground for 
competing theories of social change. The convergence theorists asserted that the 
technological imperatives of modernisation made inevitable the evolution of Japanese 
organisational patterns towards those of the West.1 The anti- convergence school argued that 
differing cultural and social contexts would produce different forms of industrial 
organisations. And in the early 1970s, the "revisionists", most notably Ronald Dore, put 
forward the argument that Japanese patterns represented not the survival of embedded cultural 
and institutional forms but later- developing, rational adaptations to the demands of modern 
industrial technology. This challenged the basic assumptions of both the convergence 
theorists that natural evolutionary processes would bring Japanese patterns to resemble 
Western patterns, and of the anti- convergence theorists that deep- rooted cultural patterns 
underlay the differences between Japan and the West. Some of the revisionists went so far as 
to suggest that any convergence would be of Western systems towards the later- developing 
Japanese patterns, which were proving better adapted to the complex requirements of modern 
technology.2 But these debates took place in relative isolation from the world outside social 
science departments. 
   The rapid growth of the Japanese economy and the emergence of Japanese competition 
from the late 1970s, however, drew the attention of businessmen and business students to this 
first non- western country to join the ranks of the highly industrialised market economies. 
While interest in labour organisation and the factory remained strong, the level of analysis of 
much of the research shifted over time the factory to the company 3 and to the Japanese 
business system as a whole. This shift was in part a response to the broadening demand from 
business for information about Japan. This broader audience was only mildly interested in the 
questions that fascinated social scientists: How did the Japanese system evolve? Were the 
basic dynamics of its evolution similar to those of Western countries, or markedly different? 
How does the Japanese case affect our general theories of social change? Instead, the business 
audience asked: How can our companies sell in Japan? How can we compete successfully with 
the Japanese? Can our companies work effectively with Japanese partners? If so, how? Is 
there anything to learn from the Japanese, or is their system grounded in such a different 
context that it is not relevant to us? 
    In other words, they were interested in Japan and Japanese firms as market and customer, 
as competitor, as strategic ally, and a model. The two sets of questions - those of the social 
scientists and those of the business people - may appear to be so different as to have no 
complementarity at all. However, although two of these perspectives - Japan as market and 
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as "strategic partner" - have been dominated by analysis produced by the popular business 
press and by non-Japan specialists, the other two - Japan as competitor and Japanese firms 
as models - have drawn considerable attention from the Japan field. And more importantly, 
the social science questions - the direction of Japan's organisational evolution and the 
extent to which Japan presents us with different models of organisations - are central to the 
different perspectives on each issue. 
JAPAN AS A MARKET 
   The characteristics of Japan's domestic market have long been seen as distinctive in both 
consumer and industrial products. To summarise in over- simplified fashion, in consumer 
goods some of the market characteristics include: a multi-layered distribution system, with 
tiers of wholesalers serving a large network of small- scale retailers who serve very local 
markets; apparent consumer preferences for quality and service over low price, and for 
established brand names; and sales and distribution systems tied to major manufacturers in 
key industries such as autos and consumer electonics, where the leading producers own their 
own retail outlets. Industrial markets are characterised by relational contracting, in which a 
firm will have a relatively small number of suppliers with whom it works very closely over 
the long term, in order to reduce costs and improve quality; just-in-time delivery systems that 
require suppliers to pace their production processes to those of their customer in order to 
minimise inventory; and simultaneous engineering, in which suppliers develop new 
components and subsystems in parallel with their customers. 
   The sizeable popular and business literature on Japan on a market tends to be clustered 
into three basic approaches: 
- Japanese distribution systems , customer requirements, and business systems are distinctive 
and likely to remain so; 
- Japanese distribution systems , customer requirements, and business systems are changing 
and becoming more like the West; 
- Japanese distribution systems , customer requirements, and business systems are not a 
product of national culture but of conscious, "rational" efforts by Japanese companies to 
restrict competition within the domestic market. They are characterised by strong, self-serving 
inertia, but are "unfair" in an era of global competition because they protect the Japanese 
market. 
   These different positions have very real implications for what Western firms should do. If 
the Japanese market is very distinctive and likely to remain so, then Western firms trying to 
enter that market should learn about and try to adapt to that market. They should set up a 
very locally responsive (and highly autonomous) subsidiary in Japan, or work through a 
Japanese partner who understands the complexities of the market. If, on the other hand, the 
Japanese market is evolving toward a more "American- style" approach, Western firms should 
seize their potential advantage by introducing Western approaches to marketing and 
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distribution into their operations in Japan, thereby moving slightly ahead of the evolutionary 
curve. And if Japanese firms have delberately cultivated certain features of the Japanese 
market in order to erect "barriers to entry" - which, we should note, is the goal of much of 
the business strategy taught in management schools today - then the most effective recourse 
is political: call your local Congressman, or lobby the United States Trade Representative's 
office. 
    Obviously these arguments mirror to a surprising extent the anti -conve rg ence, 
convergence, and revisionist arguments of the 1970s in the social sciences. They differ 
fundamentally on basic assumptions about the evolution of social systems and on perceptions 
of key elements of the Japanese system. The proponents of the first position - Japan as 
requiring adaptation to local practices - emphasize the importance of relationships and 
reputation in both consumer and industrial markets, and see these as grounded in cultural 
and/or institutional differences. The proponents of the second position, in contrast, see the 
very real elements of "value for money" in both consumer and industrial markets as the central 
factor explaining Japanese markets, and argue from that assumption that that the combination 
of the pressure of the strong yen, stagnant growth in Japan, and increased quality and delivery 
of Western competitors are bringing about a natural evolution in Japanese markets that make 
customers more open to alternatives that deliver value for money. The proponents of the third 
position emphasize the role played by Japanese firms in shaping the expectations of customers 
and building distribution systems in ways that make it difficult for new entrants to succeed; 
the implications are that the firms can and will blunt the effects of any tendencies to "natural 
evolution", at least in the short and medium term which is the time horizon of business. 
JAPAN AS COMPETITOR 
    The underlying assumptions of the anti -convergence, convergence, and revisionist 
approaches are equally relevant for the analyses of Japanese firms as competitors, which focus 
on the question of the strategic behaviour of Japanese firms. 
   Since the early 1980s, a number of analyses of the strategy of Japanese firms have been 
published, so many that a comprehensive discussion of the literature on the strategy of 
Japanese firms is well beyond the scope of this paper.4 Some of the key differences between 
Japanese strategic behaviour that have been highlighted in both the academic and the 
business literature include: 
* "evolutionary" patterns of diversification - gradual extension into new , closely- related 
businesses through internal expansion rather than acquisition - and strong resistance to 
exiting a business, even if losses mount; 
• less emphasis on profits than their Western counterparts and more on expansion; 
• a strong propensity for "oligopolistic matching" - for seeking to compete directly with new 
products and services introduced by competitors, rather than seeking to find distinctive and 
profitable "niches" that can be defended against competitors;
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  a long-term perspective on strategy and investment. 
   While there has been considerable agreement on these differences in strategic behaviours 
between Japanese and Western firms, there has been less agreement on the implications of 
those differences for the competitive strategies of Western firms or on the prospects for future 
evolution. The popular business literature includes three perspectives on Japanese 
competitive strategies and their implications: 
- The strategic behaviours of Japanese firms are very different from those of their Western 
(particularly American) counterparts, and represent a different model of strategy, grounded in 
a very different corporate structure, that is likely to persist. Western firms should therefore 
allocate resources to analysing Japanese strategies and should exploit the differences by 
4tpla
ying a different game" - adopting strategies that take maximum advantage from those 
differences. Alternatively, they could adopt an avoidance strategy: exit from industries where 
the Japanese system confers a strong competitive advantage. Lester Thurow has, for example, 
characterised the strategies of General Electric's Jack Welch as exiting from businesses where 
the company would have to face strong Japanese competitors. 
- The drivers of strategy are changing in Japan , as the business system becomes more 
integrated with global financial markets and Japanese firms put more of their activities in 
foreign subsidiaries in response to the strengthening yen, and Japanese firms will increasingly 
exhibit strategic logics and behaviours similar to those of their Western counterparts. By 
concentrating on executing their own strategies as effectively as possible, Western firms will 
develop increasing advantages over their Japanese competitors as the latter learn to play in a 
strategic arena that makes relatively unfamiliar demands on them. 
  The strategic logic of Japanese firms was a rational response to a certain competitive 
environment in Japan - steady growth, technological followership, domestic markets that 
were largely shielded from global competition - just as the strategic logic of U. S. firms was 
shaped by an environment of volatile business cycles and global technological and market 
leadership. Competition between the two is leading to mutual adjustments and changes in 
strategic behaviours that will change both systems in ways that are not yet clear. For Western 
firms, Japanese firms are important elements of the changing competitive environment to 
which they must constantly adjust. 
   Each perspective therefore has different implications for how many resources Western 
firms should devote to understanding their Japanese competitors and to what end. In the first 
and third perspectives, it is important for Western firms to analyse Japanese competitors; in 
the second, much less so. The perspectives also differ in their implicit models of strategy: the 
first perspective emphasizes the internal drivers of strategies (the structures and capabilities 
of the firm), whereas the other two emphasize the environment or business context. Finally, 
each has a different answer to the "convergence" issue: the first sees continuing divergence 
based on fundamental differences in logics and capabilities; the second expects convergence 
toward the Western model; and the third sees a complex combination of mutual adjustment 
and continuing adaptation.
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JAPANESE FIRMS AS STRATEGIC ALLIES 
   The literature on strategic alliances with Japanese firms builds directly on the 
assumptions about strategies discussed above. "Strategic alliance" is a relatively new term for 
a long- established business form: cooperation between two separate companies in the pursuit 
of some strategic objective. Traditional forms of strategic alliances include joint ventures, 
joint marketing agreements, OEM arrangements (in which one company manufactures a 
product for sale under another's brand), and cross-licensing of patents. More recent forms 
include partnerships to develop new technologies (R & D alliances) and shared new product 
development (for example, the recent alliance between Ford and Nissan to develop and 
manufacture a mini-van, in which Nissan took the responsibility for the design and Ford for 
the manufacturing). 
   In this literature, which has been dominated by business specialists, there are two major 
perspectives on Western firms undertaking alliances with Japanese partners: 
9 Different strategies and strategic logics make alliances perilous , because the Japanese 
partner's greater resources for learning (including the imbalance in language capabilities and 
greater control of the careers of individuals involved in partnerships) tend to give them 
greater advantages. Where alliances cannot be avoided, they should be regarded as a 
necessary evil: the Western partner should monitor closely and maintain exit options.5 
9 Different strategies produce complementary capabilities that make alliances potentially 
fruitful on both sides, if both partners adopt an attitude of learning. Western partners need to 
seek out Japanese partners and dedicate resources to understanding and learning from them. 
    In contrast to the previous two arenas (market and strategy), the literature on strategic 
alliances tends to hold implicitly to a "divergence" perspective: the two systems are 
fundamentally different. One viewpoint sees this as a source of peril to the Western partner in 
an alliance, the other as a potential advantage. Perhaps the implicit "divergence" perspective 
is attributable to the fact that alliances almost by definition tend to be short-term in 
orientation, and therefore analyses of alliances are concerned with a much more immediate 
time frame than discussions of market entry or strategy. But for the social scientist interested 
in Japan, alliances are potentially fascinating areas of inquiry, although the perspective is 
much less the "who wins, who loses" orientation of the businessman than the issue of whether 
the interactions between firms that are fostered by alliances result in mutual learning, and if 
so, what implication that learning has for the future evolution of the firm and the business 
system. This is particularly important in those industries where alliances have become 
pervasive, such as autos and electonics. And even for the business perspective, the social 
science perspective is a useful one. The concept of "learning" in the alliance literature is 
often treated as self- evident: one partner has an advantage in quality, for example, and 
therefore the other partner through an alliance can acquire this capability. The extent to 
which developing a "capability" involves organisational changes that affect other parts of the 
organisation, and ultimately the evolution of the organisation and the system in which it is 
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embedded, is an issue of interest to the social scientist and the business person alike-although 
it is the social scientist who is more likely to recognise it as an issue and articulate a research 
agenda to build insights into those processes. 
JAPANESE FIRMS AS MODELS: 
   By the late 1980s, students in U. S. business schools were complaining that they were 
being given too much material on Japan, and that they wanted less on Japanese successes and 
more on American successes. This reaction to the over- idealisation of Japan was irritating to 
many in the Japan field, but was all too understandable. Throughout the 1980s, the 
outstanding competitive success of Japanese firms led many business people and academics to 
flock to Japan to try to understand the key competitive success factors, in order to held U. S. 
companies learn from that "global best practice" (a phrase commonly encountered in business 
circles over the last decade). Different management specialities tended to find that Japanese 
practice exemplified what they had been trying to tell U. S. managers all along: operations 
management researchers published articles entitled "Japan: Where operations really are 
StrategiC116, marketing experts wrote books on the Japanese edge in marketing,7 human 
resource management experts identified the key to Japanese success as human resource 
management. Often this work, particularly in the early 1980s, presented a highly idealised 
pattern of Japanese practice, and seemed to be identifying Japanese practice with that of the 
most successful Japanese companies. A backlash was inevitable, and there was a short boom 
in books unmasking "the Japanese myth" - revealing that Japanese companies did not all 
succeed, that Japanese actual practice often failed to measure up to the ideal types presented 
in the literature, and that Japanese employees complained about their companies. With the 
collapse of Japan's so-called "Bubble economy" in the early 1990s and its tilt into extended 
recession, many began to argue that Japan no longer had anything to teach the United States. 
   Even those who granted that leading Japanese companies had developed a number of 
superior ways of doing things (in quality control, for example, or linking product development 
and manufacturing) did not agree on the implications. To over-simplify somewhat, the debate 
took place among three major assumptions: 
- "Best practice" is adaptable to all business contexts in an era of global competition . 
Therefore U. S. companies should strive to learn from the Japanese in those arenas in which 
they set the standards of global best practice. 
- "Best practice" is best only in a certain context; it does not trasnfer easily across different 
business and social systems. Cross-societal learning is extremely difficult, if not dangerous, 
because it involves system- level changes. U. S. companies should seek out models of best 
practice at home. 
- "Best practice" requires adaptation to fit difference contexts , and this demands creativity 
and innovation. But cross-border learning is inevitable in an era of global competition, and 
therefore U. S. companies should strive to do it creatively. The result will be patterns that are
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different both from past U. S. practice and from the Japanese model. 
   It is in the context of this debate over learning from Japan that the continuities in theme 
and concepts with the social science studies of Japanese organisation over the decades most 
resonate, and where Japan specialists have made contributions that have the greatest 
immediate relevance for managers.8 But the fundamental question of the direction of the 
evolution of Japanese business organisations and the business system is one that underlies 
both the business and the social science literature.
CONCLUSION
   One of the contributions that Japan social scientists can make to the discussions of 
Japanese business organisations and how Western companies should interact with them is to 
clarify the underlying assumptions of the various positions in those discussions. Another is to 
conitnue to produce solidly grounded empirical research on Japanese organisations. 
   The underlying assumptions about organisational evolution that have emerged in the 
course of the long discussions of Japanese business take three forms: 
9 unilinear .- business systems in modern industrial societies compete with each other in a 
Darwinian world of "selection and retention of the fittest", in which cross-border learning 
produces convergence to "global best practice"; 
  Multilinear.- institutional systems persist over time, and therefore diverse forms of business 
organisation can and will continue to exist even in a world of increasingly international 
competition, with some cross-border learning that is restricted to relatively minor adaptations 
to the forms dominant in each particular context; 
  dynamic multilinear.- cross-border learning is accelerating in pace and scope, but will produce 
ongoing distinctive innovations adapted to specific contexts (tomorrow's Japanese firms will 
differ both from Japanese firms today and U. S. firms today and tomorrow). 
   These positions are analogous to the convergence debates of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and parallel the three positions in that debate: the convergence approach (which 
assumes that there is one best way of doing things towards which social systems will 
converge); the anti- convergence approach; and the revisionist approach that shares with the 
anti- convergence perspective the believe that social patterns evolve in response to specific 
social and institutional contexts and with the convengence approach the assumption that in 
systems that interact with each other there will be mutual emulation and learning. 
    These positions are as fundamental to the arguments over business interactions between 
Japan and the United States and Europe (and the rest of Asia) as they were to the more 
academic modernisation debates over the evolution of industrial society in the 1960s. And 
like those earlier debates, they can best be addressed not by professions of faith in one or 
another of the basic positions but in empirical research on business organisation. Here is 
where the interests of the Japan social scientists and the business community converge. Both 
want to have answers to similar kinds of questions: what are the critical indicators of
1-347
organisational change? do our existing frameworks provide an adequate basis for identifying 
these indicators, or do we need to rethink our frameworks to accomodate Japanese patterns? 
and would such accomodation help develop better theories that would in turn improve our 
understanding of the evolution of organisations in general? In answering these questions, the 
research of the Japan social science community will address the key questions of the brad 
constitutencies of the management schools, and will raise the level of the debates over the 
interaction between the Japanese and U. S. business systems.
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